نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه دانشگاه شهید بهشتی

چکیده

در ادبیات فلسفی معاصر، عمل عامدانه و آزادانه فرد برخلاف داوری بهترش همزمان با عناوین آکراسیا و ضعف اراده شناخته می‌شود و بحث‌ها در این حوزه بر سر امکان و تبیین چنین عملی است. اما ریچارد هولتون مدّعی است فیلسوفان در یکی دانستن آکراسیا و ضعف اراده مرتکب خطا شده‌اند. به عقیده او کاربران معمول زبان، ضعف اراده را وصف تغییر ناموجّه تصمیم فرد می‌دانند و تعبیر «عمل خلاف داوری بهتر فرد» معنای مفهوم برساخته فیلسوفان یعنی آکراسیا است. به‌ همین‌دلیل او معتقد است پیش‌فرضی نادرست در بحث‌‌های دربارۀ ضعف اراده وجود دارد. آلفرد ملی کوشید با توسل به روش‌های فلسفه‌های تجربی نشان دهد عقل سلیم مدعای هولتون را تأیید نمی‌‌کند. نقد او با پاسخ هولتون و مِی‌ همراه بود. در این مقاله می‌کوشیم ضمن بازخوانی بحث‌های دامنه‌دار انجام شده دربارۀ این موضوع نشان دهیم چرا هولتون چنین مدّعایی را مطرح می‌کند، چرا این بحث به فلسفه تجربی کشیده شده است و لوازم طرح بحث در چنین فضایی کدام است؟ و در پایان پس از ارزیابی دیدگاه‌های معرفی شده، تعریفی از ضعف اراده ارائه می‌کنیم که اولاً تا حدّ امکان به درک عقل سلیم از این مفهوم نزدیک باشد و ثانیاً موضوعیت مسئله سنّتی ضعف اراده (تببین امکان آن) را از میان نبرد. 

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Weakness of Will-Akrasia; The Contemporary Challenge on meaning

نویسنده [English]

  • Mahmoud Moghaddasi

PhD student of philosophy, Shahid Beheshti University of Tehran

چکیده [English]

In contemporary philosophical literature, acting against one's better (all things considered) judgment is referred to akrasia as well as "weakness of will" and the debate is on the possibility of such an action and the way one can explain this possibility. But the debate went further and the very definition of the term "weakness of will" appeared to be questionable. Richard Holton, claimed that when we look at discussions on "weakness of will", we see something other than what is supposed to be. He continues that common sense takes "weakness of will" to be something other than acting against one's better judgment. According to Holton, people attribute "weakness of will" to over-readily revising a resolution and failure to act on one's intention. He argues that philosophical debate is on akrasia( acting against one's better judgment) rather than weakness of will and there is a misconception here. Since he declares something about common sense, his claim would be experimentally falsifiable. Alfred Mele tried to examine Holton's claim using the methods of experimental philosophy. Finally, Mele found that neither Holton nor the philosophical literature is correct. He proposed a disjunctive model for the attribution of 'weakness of will'. Then Holton and May criticized Mele's model and proposed a new model based on various experiments. Since then there is an ongoing debate on this issue. In this article I try to make a critical review of this current debate and to examine why Holton made such a claim, what are the implications of claiming that? Finally I propose a Hybrid model which covers the findings of experiments and reserves the importance of classical problem of "weakness of will" as discussed by philosophers.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • weakness of will-akrasia-resolution-better judgment-action-Holton-Mele
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