سخن سردبیر

This issue of Shenakht opens with three articles in contemporary philosophy of mind, three studies that each, from a different angle, grapple with the problem of consciousness and its place in the physicalist picture of the world. The first article, “The Constitutive Nature of Phenomenal Concepts and the Limits of Externalism,” addresses the challenge that social externalism poses to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. The author, drawing on Li Zhang’s analysis and Chalmers’ distinction between indexical phenomenal concepts and pure phenomenal concepts, shows that the constitutive approach is the only plausible option for explaining the direct reference of phenomenal concepts, and that social externalism holds only for relational and standing phenomenal concepts, not for pure phenomenal concepts whose nature is constituted by experience. The second article, “The Formulation of Physicalism and Its Challenges,” takes a step back and asks how the physicalist claim must be formulated in order to withstand classical objections. The author examines three major problems, namely Hempel’s Dilemma, the Problem of Extras, and the Problem of Blockers, and argues that adopting a primitive concept of physical properties resolves the first problem, while among the strategies successful in addressing the second, only David Chalmers’ solution proves capable of resolving the Problem of Blockers. The third article, “From the Vagueness of Material Objects to Emergent Substance Dualism,” places Dean Zimmerman’s novel argument at the center of discussion: the vagueness of ordinary material objects and the problem of the many challenge materialism. While offering a more streamlined formulation of Zimmerman’s argument and demonstrating the inadequacy of materialist replies, the author argues that any attempt by the materialist to sharpen the material boundaries of the self in order to escape the problem of vagueness inevitably commits them to a framework that no longer maintains a clear boundary with emergent substance dualism.
    Since any discussion of consciousness and mind also raises the question of the knowing agent, the next two articles address the problem of belief and epistemic agency, each from a distinct perspective. The fourth article, “Self-Fulfilling Beliefs and Doxastic Voluntarism in Contemporary Epistemology,” examines attempts to defend doxastic voluntarism at least under specific conditions and for a limited range of beliefs, namely conditions in which there is a special relationship between the voluntary act of believing and the truth of the belief’s content. After surveying different versions of this idea in the works of Velleman, Peels, and Reisner, the author evaluates and reinforces Antill’s critique, concluding that neither self-fulfilling beliefs nor situations of epistemic suspension can serve as evidence for doxastic voluntarism. The fifth article, “The Knowing Agent from the Perspective of the Quran,” approaches the same question from an entirely different angle. Focusing on the fundamental question of who the knowing agent is from the perspective of the Noble Quran, the author analyzes the position of the “heart” (qalb) as the primary candidate for this role. Drawing on Quranic verses and implicitly critiquing rival viewpoints, the study shows that the “heart,” in Quranic terminology, is the immaterial and comprehensive reality of the human being, and that other faculties such as hearing, sight, and even the act of reasoning (ta’aqqul) operate as its instrumental cognitive faculties, a coherent epistemological model in which cognition, emotion, and volition converge within a single center.
      The issue closes with two articles in broader horizons. The sixth article, “The Paradox of Time in Augustine’s Theology,” shows how two apparently irreconcilable passages, one from the Book of Wisdom emphasizing instantaneous creation and the other from Genesis highlighting gradual creation, confront Augustine with a deep internal contradiction in his conception of time. Employing a descriptive-analytical method, the author shows that Augustine resolves the problem of instantaneous creation by appealing to the doctrine of rationes seminales, but that by denying time any external reality, he faces a serious difficulty in explaining gradual creation and ultimately ends in contradiction. Finally, the seventh article, “Bio-Art and the Philosophy of Difference,” focusing on Eduardo Kac’s work “Alba,” proposes a theoretical model for analyzing transgenic art. Integrating Deleuze’s philosophy, including the concepts of the larval subject and simulacrum, with Simondon’s theory of individuation, the author demonstrates that the metabolism of the Green Fluorescent Protein (GFP) in Alba embodies a “larval subject” that, by redefining the organism-environment relationship and preserving species differences as a simulacrum, challenges anthropocentrism in art and philosophy and actualizes the shift of art from the realm of representation to the realm of biotechnology.
     It is hoped that these seven studies will open a new window onto philosophical reflection.