طبیعی‌گرایی و فرافلسفهٔ زمان

نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی

نویسنده

گروه مطالعات علم، موسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران

10.48308/kj.2025.240443.1329

چکیده

در دهه‌های اخیر، متامتافیزیک به عرصه‌ای مهم برای بررسی روش‌شناسی و موضوع متافیزیک در سنت تحلیلی تبدیل شده است. رویکردهای طبیعی‌گرایانه تلاش می‌کنند متافیزیک را با علوم طبیعی هم‌سو سازند. در مقابل، شماری از فیلسوفان چون جاناتان لو از استقلال متافیزیک دفاع می‌کنند و آن را پژوهشی عقلانی و پیشینی در باب امکان‌های متافیزیکی می‌نگرند، به‌طوری‌که مساهمت علم در این میان، به‌تعبیری، در تعیین مصادیق صادقِ این امکان‌ها خواهد بود. در حوزهٔ فلسفهٔ زمان، علی‌رغم ارجاعات پراکنده به این حوزه، معدود آثاری چون اثر اخیر هتر دایک به‌طور مستقیم به طبیعی‌سازی متافیزیک زمان می‌پردازند. این مقاله از رویکردی غیرطبیعی‌گرایانه به متافیزیک زمان دفاع می‌کند و ضمن بررسی امکان‌های مختلفِ تعامل علم و متافیزیک، سه رویکرد اصلی طبیعی‌گرایانه را مدنظر قرار می‌دهد: الف) متافیزیک به‌مثابه نظریه‌ای برگرفته از علم، ب) متافیزیک در خدمت علم، و ج) رویکرد میانه‌روانه با پذیرش استقلال نسبی متافیزیک. در این مقاله کوشش بر آن است که نشان داده شود این رویکردها در مواجهه با متافیزیک زمان با چالش‌هایی روبه‌رو هستند و در نهایت، ناتوان از کنار گذاشتن یا فاصله گرفتن از تلقیِ لویی متافیزیک به‌عنوان علمِ امر ممکن‌اند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Naturalism and the Metaphilosophy of Time

نویسنده [English]

  • Hassan Amiriara
Science Studies Department, Iranian Institute of Philosophy
چکیده [English]

In recent decades, metametaphysics has emerged as a central arena for examining the methodology and subject matter of metaphysics within the analytic tradition. Naturalistic approaches seek to align metaphysics with the natural sciences. In contrast, a number of philosophers—most notably Jonathan Lowe—defend the autonomy of metaphysics, conceiving it as a rational and a priori inquiry into metaphysical possibilities, such that the contribution of science lies in identifying the actual instances of these possibilities. In the field of the metaphysics of time, despite occasional references to this domain, only a few works—such as Heather Dyke’s recent study—explicitly focus on the naturalization of the metaphysics of time. This paper defends a non-naturalistic approach to the metaphysics of time. It explores the various ways in which science and metaphysics might interact and considers three principal naturalistic strategies: (a) metaphysics as derived from science; (b) metaphysics as serving science; and (c) a moderate approach that grants metaphysics a degree of methodological independence. The paper argues that these approaches, when applied to the metaphysics of time, face significant difficulties and ultimately fail to abandon, or distance themselves from, the Loweian conception of metaphysics as a science of the possible.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Metametaphysics
  • Metaphysics of Time
  • Naturalism
  • Metaphysical Possibility
  • Special Relativity
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