نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، گروه فلسفه
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The concept of time plays a central role in both Descartes’ physics and his metaphysics, yet he never treats it as an independent and systematically developed topic in its own right. This gap has led to starkly different, and often conflicting, interpretations. Some commentators argue that the Cartesian framework is fundamentally discrete and atomistic, while others contend that it is essentially continuous. This divide has its source in the complexity of Descartes’ own writings: his scattered and sometimes seemingly inconsistent remarks about time can be marshalled in support of both positions.
This article asks whether Descartes ultimately understood time as continuous (infinitely divisible) or discontinuous (a form of temporal atomism). Drawing on the work of Ken Levy, Geoffrey Gorham, Norman Kemp Smith, and Martial Guéroult, together with close readings of Descartes’ primary texts—especially the Meditations on First Philosophy and the Principles of Philosophy—it argues that both the textual evidence and the philosophical considerations point toward a commitment to temporal atomism, in the strong sense of discontinuity. The rival view, which attributes to Descartes a robust doctrine of temporal continuity, is examined in detail, and its limitations are brought to light.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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