مهندسی مفهومی و برخی چالش‌های روش‌شناختی

محمدعلی خلج, محمد حسین; آیت‌الله‌زاده شیرازی, سیدمحمدحسن

doi:10.48308/kj.2025.240849.1340

مهندسی مفهومی و برخی چالش‌های روش‌شناختی

نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی

نویسندگان

¹ دانشکده علوم انسانی. دانشگاه خاتم. تهران. ایرن

² گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران

10.48308/kj.2025.240849.1340

چکیده

فلسفۀ تحلیلی در سال‌های اخیر با چالش‌های روش‌شناختی گوناگونی مواجه بوده است. در مقالۀ حاضر، ابتدا دو مورد از این چالش‌ها به بحث گذاشته می‌شود که دو روش مرکزی فلسفۀ تحلیلی را زیر سؤال می‌برند، یکی معطوف به روش تحلیل زبانی و دیگری معطوف به روش آزمایش فکری. در ادامه به معرفی مهندسی مفهومی به‌منزلۀ یک روش نوپا که برای غلبه بر چالش‌های روش‌شناختی فلسفۀ تحلیلی طراحی شده است می‌پردازیم. پس از تقریر کلیات این رویکرد، پاسخ‌های آن به دو چالش بالا را بحث می‌کنیم و از معقولیت آن‌ها دفاع می‌نماییم. افزون بر این، ما دو ایدۀ تازه را نیز درموردِ مهندسی مفهومی به اشتراک می‌گذاریم، یک ایده یک صورت‌بندی‌ جامعِ پنج‌مرحله‌ای از مهندسی مفهومی است که نسبتِ آن را با برخی حوزه‌های مرتبط همچون زبان‌شناسی و فلسفۀ آزمایشی به تصویر درمی‌آورد. دومی پاسخی تازه به چالش معطوف به آزمایش فکری است که نگرانی‌های پاسخ کنونی در موردش مطرح نشود. بدین‌ترتیب، مقالۀ حاضر نه‌تنها ادبیات مهندسی مفهومی را برای نخستین بار به زبان فارسی معرفی می‌کند بلکه آن را یک گام نیز به جلو می‌برد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

فلسفۀ تحلیلی

عنوان مقاله [English]

Conceptual Engineering and Some Methodological Challenges

نویسندگان [English]

M Hosein M A Khalaj ¹
Seyyed Mohammad Hassan Ayatollahzade Shirazi ²

¹ Faculty of Humanities, Khatam University. Tehran. Iran

² Faculty of Literature and Humanities. Shahid Beheshti. Tehran. Iran

چکیده [English]

In recent years, analytic philosophy has faced various methodological challenges. The present paper begins by discussing two of these challenges, both of which question central methods of analytic philosophy—namely, the method of linguistic analysis and the method of thought experiments. The paper then introduces conceptual engineering as an emerging methodology designed to address these methodological concerns. After outlining the general framework of this approach, we examine its responses to the two aforementioned challenges and defend their plausibility. In addition, we present two novel ideas regarding conceptual engineering. The first is a comprehensive five-stage model that maps the relationship between conceptual engineering and relevant fields such as linguistics and experimental philosophy. The second is a new response to the challenge posed to the use of thought experiments, one that avoids the criticisms raised against existing responses. In this way, the paper not only introduces the literature on conceptual engineering in Persian for the first time but also advances it by offering original contributions.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

conceptual engineering
linguistic analysis
thought experiment
experimental philosophy

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