نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
گروه فلسفه و عرفان اسلامی، دانشکدهی ادیان و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه بینالمللی مذاهب اسلامی، تهران، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Religious disagreement poses a fundamental challenge in the philosophy of religion and epistemology, raising profound questions regarding the rationality of religious beliefs and believers’ commitments. This article offers a thorough and detailed analysis of John Pittard’s theory in Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. Pittard introduces the concept of “internal rational defense,” proposing a model that enables believers to maintain deep commitment to their religious convictions while simultaneously acknowledging the widespread and serious disagreements across various religious beliefs. This approach seeks to balance religious loyalty with epistemic humility and to preserve sincere dialogue amid religious diversity. Alongside an extensive exposition of Pittard’s views, the article critically examines key epistemological and philosophical challenges, including the risk of relativism inherent in the distinction between individual and intersubjective rationality, the ambiguity surrounding the boundaries between rational loyalty and dogmatism, the proximity of Pittard’s framework to reformed epistemology, and the insufficient articulation of epistemic responsibility in the face of disagreement. The practical and cultural implications of this approach are also explored, followed by proposals to develop and strengthen the theory. Ultimately, this paper aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of religious rationality in a pluralistic world and to promote interfaith dialogue by highlighting the necessity of more precise definitions of rational criteria and epistemic duties.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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