نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
محقق مقیم در پژوهشکده فلسفه تحلیلی در پژوهشگاه دانش های بنیادی
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Over the past three decades, many philosophers of language have concluded that traditional theories of propositions fail to adequately explain how propositions represent the world as being certain ways. As a result, alternative theories are necessary. One such theory is the act-type theory, which posits that a proposition is a type of predication. Peter Hanks is a prominent advocate of this theory, arguing that predication is a committal act. However, this raises the Frege-Geach problem. Hanks proposes a cancellation maneuver to address this issue. In this paper, I introduce the act-type theory, clarify how predication is committal, explain the Frege-Geach problem, and outline the cancellation maneuver. I then raise two concerns regarding this maneuver and conclude that it, in its current form, does not satisfactorily resolve the Frege-Geach problem. Finally, I suggest two alternative approaches that a proponent of this maneuver might pursue to address the Frege-Geach problem.
کلیدواژهها [English]