نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی
نویسنده
پژوهشگاه دانشهای بنیادی
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) is a central response to the Knowledge Argument. Still, it faces the challenge of social externalism, which holds that phenomenal concepts—such as the concept of arthritis in Tyler Burge’s thought experiment—can be acquired without experience and merely through deference to a linguistic community. This paper argues that the analogy is flawed. After surveying and criticizing mastery-based responses and showing their dialectical dead ends, the paper adopts a different approach. Drawing on Li Zhang’s (2024) analysis, it argues that synthetic physicalism faces a dilemma in explaining the direct reference of phenomenal concepts: either a demonstrative (indexical) approach or a constitutive approach. By rejecting the demonstrative approach—using Zhang’s arguments (the case of visual agnosia) and David Chalmers’ distinction between indexical phenomenal concepts and pure phenomenal concepts—the constitutive approach is established as the only plausible option. In the final section, employing Chalmers’ (2003) precise taxonomy, it is shown that Burge-style externalism applies only to relational and standing phenomenal concepts, but fails with respect to pure phenomenal concepts, whose nature is constituted by experience. This conclusion, while acknowledging the social dimensions of phenomenal language, vindicates the experiential requirement for the core of phenomenal concepts
کلیدواژهها [English]
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