نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی
نویسنده
پژوهشگاه دانشهای بنیادین
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Physicalism, in brief, is the claim that everything in the world is physical. Yet it seems that certain entities and properties, whose existence imposes itself upon us, stand in conflict with this claim and render its acceptance problematic. Consciousness is among the mental features whose attempted reduction has arisen as a challenge to physicalists. For according to physicalism, everything has a metaphysical dependence on physical matters. But this challenge can only be properly situated once we have a clear picture of what physicalism asserts. This is the path into which the present essay intends to venture. In this essay, I will address three major objections to the formulation of physicalism, under the headings of “Hempel’s Dilemma,” “the Problem of Explanatory Excess,” and “the Problem of Blockers.” I argue that the first objection can be resolved by adopting a preliminary conception of physical properties. However, among the solutions that have succeeded in addressing the second problem, only David Chalmers’ proposal can adequately respond to the third.
کلیدواژهها [English]
)