نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشآموختۀ دکتری فلسفۀ معاصر، دانشگاه بینالمللی امام خمینی، قزوین
2 استاد گروه فلسفۀ دانشگاه بینالمللی امام خمینی، قزوین، ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
This paper critically examines the Mind Uploading Hypothesis (MU), which posits that it is possible to transfer the mind from a biological to a non-biological substrate. According to this hypothesis, by precisely simulating the brain and converting it into an informational pattern, this pattern can be implemented on any suitable substrate, thereby achieving immortality and overcoming death. We argue that this hypothesis is based on a computationalist/functionalist reading of the mind that reduces the mind and consciousness to a set of computational processes and informational patterns. The hypothesis faces two fundamental metaphysical problems: consciousness and personal identity. Mind uploading, with a functionalist interpretation of consciousness, defines it as substrate-independent. Furthermore, the hypothesis considers psychological continuity to be the condition for preserving personal identity. We will argue that adopting these approaches is merely an unjustifiable assertion, and that rival theories, such as biological theories, are overlooked. It will also be examined that the Mind Uploading Hypothesis faces serious challenges in explaining consciousness and personal identity after the transfer process. By ignoring human embodied existence in the world, this hypothesis reduces identity merely to informational patterns and, in doing so, fails to explain the phenomenological and first-person nature of consciousness. Ultimately, the choice of a psychological continuity approach will fail to preserve personal identity, and thus, mind uploading will fail in explaining both of its fundamental metaphysical problems.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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