نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 گروه فلسفه دانشگاه تبریز
2 استاد فلسفه دانشکده ادبیات و زبانهای خارجی دانشگاه تبریز- گروه فلسفه
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
In this paper, drawing on Leibniz’s works and Robert Brandom’s inferentialist reading in his 1981 essay “Leibniz and Degrees of Perception,” the concept of perception, its degrees of clarity, and the relation between these degrees and apperception (consciousness) in Leibniz’s philosophy are examined, along with their role in the individuation of monads. The main issue explored is the function of perceptual clarity in differentiating monads and the relation between clarity of perception and consciousness. In other words, if all perceptions are in some sense distinct, why are not all monads equally conscious? Brandom’s view, through his inferentialist interpretation of perception and the introduction of the notion of a “discursive domain,” treats perceptions as inferentially contentful, considering greater inferential richness to constitute greater distinctness of perception. On this basis, a model emerges that, while preserving the principle that each monad represents the entire world, explains the varying degrees of monadic consciousness and the distribution of expressive content among them. Furthermore, in this model, apperception (consciousness) is regarded as a higher-order perception that determines the content of lower-order perception; thus, consciousness is conceived as an expanded form of perception, and not every distinct perception is necessarily conscious. Ultimately, this study offers a model for understanding the difference between perception and consciousness, clarifies certain interpretive ambiguities in Leibniz’s philosophy, and responds to objections such as the problem of “bare monads.”
کلیدواژهها [English]
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