An Analysis of Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant’s Concept of “Disinterestedness” in the Third Critique

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Authors
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy of Art, Faculty of Art and Architecture, Bu-Ali Sina University, Hamedan, Iran
10.48308/kj.2026.246229.1491
Abstract
The article critically seeks to demonstrate how Heidegger, contrary to his fundamental critique of modern aesthetics (primarily developed in Nietzsche I), presents Kant as a source of inspiration in confronting the crisis of technology. In this regard, with attention to Heidegger's two main theses concerning modern aesthetics—namely, the subjectivist thesis and the thesis of metaphysical truth—we find that he attributes neither of these theses to Kant. Instead, he interprets disinterestedness as "free favour" (freie Gunst) and "letting-be" (Gelassenheit), linking it to Kant's concept of the "pleasure of reflection." To this end, employing a descriptive-analytical method and drawing on Heidegger's own texts, the polemical context of his lecture courses, and contemporary interpretations, the article attempts to show that Heidegger's reading of Kant, while creative and influential, faces challenges such as the neglect of aesthetic ideas and the hermeneutical nature of his interpretation of disinterestedness. Ultimately, the article demonstrates that the apparent inconsistency between Heidegger's general narrative of the history of aesthetics and his sympathetic interpretation of Kant is not a sign of intellectual confusion but rather reflects his twofold use of the history of philosophy: a "diagnostic use" for understanding the present situation, and a "positive use" for drawing inspiration from past philosophy as a kind of "pass" (Zuspiel). These two uses, which are explicitly formulated in Heidegger's later works such as the Contributions to Philosophy, indicate that he understands the history of philosophy not as a succession of doctrines but as a source for questioning.
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Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 03 November 2026

  • Receive Date 31 August 2026
  • Revise Date 08 October 2026
  • Accept Date 03 November 2026