Disagreement and Its Epistemological Implications for Pyrrhonian Skepticism

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Author
Iman Khodafard
PhD Candidate in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran.
10.48308/kj.2026.244656.1440
Abstract
This paper examines whether Pyrrhonian skeptics can appeal to disagreement as a ground for suspending judgment without thereby committing themselves to the very dogmatism they seek to avoid. Throughout his works, Sextus Empiricus repeatedly invokes disagreement as a basis for epochē, both at the beginning of inquiry and at its provisional conclusion.
Pyrrhonian skeptics insist that their investigative project must remain free from all forms of dogmatism, whether positive or negative. However, Sextus’ discussion in Outlines of Pyrrhonism I. 31–34 seems to rely on a form of disagreement that may be characterized as merely possible disagreement. Such an appeal threatens to foreclose the search for truth from the outset and thus appears to presuppose a negatively dogmatic stance. Moreover, the move from disagreement to suspension of judgment may itself depend on substantive theoretical assumptions, thereby compromising the methodological neutrality that Pyrrhonian skepticism claims to preserve.
The paper argues that, despite their explicit rejection of dogmatism, Pyrrhonian skeptics risk embracing dogmatic commitments in the conclusions generated by their appeal to disagreement . In particular, the appeal to merely possible disagreement appears to yield a negatively dogmatic result that sits uneasily with the Pyrrhonian ideal of suspension of judgment.
Keywords
Sextus Empiricus
Pyrrhonian Scepticism
suspension of judgment
disagreement
merely possible disagreement
Subjects
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  • Receive Date 31 May 2026
  • Revise Date 27 June 2026
  • Accept Date 17 July 2026