Self-Fulfilling Beliefs and Doxastic Voluntarism in contemporary epistemology

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Author
hussein joodi
Department of Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, International University of Islamic Denominations, Tehran, Iran.
10.48308/kj.2026.242603.1383
Abstract
Generally, in 20th-century epistemology, belief was considered an involuntary state based on evidence, and its formation was not subject to the subject's will or decision. In the 21st century, various attempts have been made to defend voluntarism in belief (doxastic voluntarism). According to one group of these attempts, voluntarism is defensible, at least under specific conditions and for a limited range of beliefs. This includes situations where there is a special relationship between the voluntary act of believing and the truth of the belief's content, such that the truth of the belief is guaranteed either conceptually or due to specific circumstances upon believing. This article examines different versions of this idea in the works of David Velleman and Rick Peels (based on self-fulfilling beliefs) and Andrew Reisner (based on epistemic suspension). Subsequently, Gregory Antill's critique against these efforts is analyzed, and it is shown that this critique, in its current form, lacks sufficient force. Finally, Antill's critique is reinforced, and it is argued that self-fulfilling beliefs and situations of epistemic suspension cannot serve as evidence for doxastic voluntarism. Consequently, the defense of voluntarism, even for specific and limited cases, faces serious problems.
Keywords
belief
voluntarism
epistemic responsibility
practical reasons
doxastic involuntarism
Subjects
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  • Receive Date 23 November 2025
  • Revise Date 09 December 2025
  • Accept Date 06 May 2026