The Validity of Thought Experiments as a Method of Philosophy

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Author
Amirreza Farzamkia
Department of Philosophy, humanities faculty, tarbiat modares university, tehran, Iran
10.48308/kj.2025.240440.1330
Abstract
Thought experiments have been used for different purposes in contemporary philosophy, such as epistemic, illustrative, and heuristic reasons. The epistemic function of thought experiments typically aims to elicit intuition-based judgments that can serve as evidence for the premises of arguments. Advocates for the use of thought experiments aim to demonstrate that the judgments they elicit often possess the same validity as those made in everyday life, an argument known as the Parity defense. The parity defense shows that both judgments use the same psychological capacity. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that these intuitions are unreliable and even if the parity defense is true, the validity of ordinary judgments themselves must be questioned. Here, besides categorizing different definitions of what we mean by the epistemic function of thought experiments, I will examine criticisms of the epistemic function of these intuitions to show that even if some are considerable, it cannot be concluded that the use of thought experiments must be set aside from philosophy.
Keywords
: method
thought experiment
intuition
ordinary judgments
evidence
Subjects
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  • Receive Date 25 June 2025
  • Revise Date 21 July 2025
  • Accept Date 20 August 2025