An Outline of Heidegger's Metaphilosophy

The emergence of "metaphilosophy" as a distinct field of inquiry can be seen as a response to the contemporary crisis of philosophy—namely, its struggle to justify both its authenticity and its practical relevance. Yet this very crisis may also yield significant opportunities for philosophical thinking, particularly by providing a framework for a systematic and problem-oriented re-reading of the history of philosophy. This paper examines key elements of Heidegger’s thought through the lens of contemporary metaphilosophical models, aiming to clarify their potential contribution to ongoing philosophical debates. To this end, we begin by reviewing four dominant paradigms identified in the metaphilosophical literature as fundamental modes of philosophizing—namely, Platonism, philosophy as the logic of science, philosophy as transcendental inquiry, and philosophy as worldview. We then explore Heidegger’s relation to each of these approaches. Subsequently, in light of contemporary discussions about the methodological status of philosophy, we reconsider Heidegger’s account of what philosophy is, with particular attention to the problem of method. Finally, we conclude by framing this reassessment as a prelude to the broader question of whether a reconciliation—or even a synthesis—between these traditions remains possible in our present philosophical horizon.