Attention and Visual Consciousness

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Author
Faraz Attar
PHD Graduate/Iranian Institute for Research in Philosophy
10.48308/kj.2025.239617.1320
Abstract
The phenomenology of ordinary perceptual experiences reveals a close tie between attention and visual consciousness. Mainly speaking, if we attend to something, we are conscious of it, and if we are conscious of something, we can direct our attention towards its particulars. But what exactly is the nature of the relationship? Is attention a necessary or sufficient condition for consciousness? Ordinary experiences alone cannot answer the question. To reach a compelling answer, philosophical reflections and empirical evidence should be merged. Adopting this approach, the paper claims that attention is not a necessary or sufficient condition for visual consciousness. To prove the claim, we just need to demonstrate that there is a case of awareness without attention and a case of attention without awareness.  For awareness without attention, identity crowding, and certain cases of ordinary experiences, and for attention without attention, some instances of blindsight and Jiang’s experiment are referred to. Furthermore, as a supplementary move, opposing viewpoints are introduced. In order to defend the main claim, the views are criticized.
Keywords
attention
visual consciousness
phenomenology
inattentional blindness
blindsight
Subjects
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  • Receive Date 23 April 2025
  • Revise Date 18 June 2025
  • Accept Date 19 July 2025