Metaphysics and Observation: A Critical Examination of McLaurin and Dyke’s Views on the Relationship Between Metaphysics and Science

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Science Studies Department, Iranian Institute of Philosophy

10.48308/kj.2025.238253.1293

Abstract

In recent decades, naturalism in metametaphysics has manifested through debates surrounding both the methodology and subject matter of metaphysics. One significant point in these debates is the criterion proposed by Ladyman and Ross (2007) for distinguishing naturalized metaphysics from non-naturalized metaphysics. McLaurin and Dyke (2012), while critiquing Ladyman and Ross’s proposal, offer an alternative approach to naturalized metaphysics. According to them, a metaphysical theory qualifies as naturalized if it can, in principle, have observational consequences. McLeod and Parsons (2013) challenge this proposal by pointing to long-standing objections against the verifiability criterion of logical positivism. They argue that the distinction between naturalized and non-naturalized metaphysics cannot hinge on a semantic connection between theoretical content and observational statements. In their critique, they briefly mention the B-theory of time. This article first explains McLaurin and Dyke’s criterion for delimiting naturalized metaphysics, McLeod and Parsons’ critique, and McLaurin and Dyke’s subsequent response (2013). We then focus on the A-theory vs. B-theory debate in contemporary metaphysics to highlight additional issues with McLaurin and Dyke’s criterion. We argue that their approach (1) risks circularity, (2) undermines the possibility of naturalizing metaphysical debates, and (3) fails to address the relationship between metaphysical theories and future scientific developments.

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References

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  • Receive Date: 05 January 2025
  • Accept Date: 01 February 2025

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