The Nature and Types of Ignorance in the Epistemological Structure of Mulla Sadra's Transcendental Wisdom

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Professor Of Department of Theology, Payame Noor Unvierstiy, Tehran, Iran

10.48308/kj.2025.238326.1297

Abstract

This article uses a descriptive-analytical method to explain the nature of ignorance and its types in Mulla Sadra's works. Sometimes, ignorance is referred to as (1) lack of knowledge, sometimes (2) lack of true belief, and sometimes (3) lack of knowledge or true belief. Mulla Sadra's view on the relationship between knowledge, imagination, and affirmation shows that, from his perspective, ignorance cannot be limited to a lack of knowledge (imagination) or a lack of belief (affirmation). Mulla Sadra classifies ignorance into three categories: (1) simple ignorance, (2) compound ignorance, and (3) ignorance opposed to reason. In Mulla Sadra's intellectual system, different types of ignorance exist in contrast to justified true belief: (a) false belief, or belief in things that are contrary to reality; (b) unjustified true belief, such as imitative true beliefs without justified reason; (c) disbelief—the failure to acknowledge and denial of justified true belief due to prejudice, stubbornness, or concealment of the truth; (d) suspension of judgment regarding a true belief in a state of doubt and uncertainty; (e) light inattention (negligence) toward a true belief that can be resolved with attention; (f) heavy inattention (negligence) toward a true belief that cannot be resolved with attention (deep ignorance); (g) lack of talent or ability to pay attention, understand, and acknowledge a true belief (complete ignorance). Based on the doctrine of transcendental wisdom regarding doubt, the types of ignorance can be considered as different levels and degrees of severe and weak ignorance.

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References

 
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History

  • Receive Date: 10 January 2025
  • Revise Date: 31 January 2025
  • Accept Date: 31 January 2025

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