The Act-type Theory of Propositions and Cancellation Maneuver

Document Type : Original Article

Author

Resident researcher at faculty of analytic philosophy in IPM

10.48308/kj.2024.237527.1284

Abstract

Over the past three decades, many philosophers of language have concluded that traditional theories of propositions fail to adequately explain how propositions represent the world as being certain ways. As a result, alternative theories are necessary. One such theory is the act-type theory, which posits that a proposition is a type of predication. Peter Hanks is a prominent advocate of this theory, arguing that predication is a committal act. However, this raises the Frege-Geach problem. Hanks proposes a cancellation maneuver to address this issue. In this paper, I introduce the act-type theory, clarify how predication is committal, explain the Frege-Geach problem, and outline the cancellation maneuver. I then raise two concerns regarding this maneuver and conclude that it, in its current form, does not satisfactorily resolve the Frege-Geach problem. Finally, I suggest two alternative approaches that a proponent of this maneuver might pursue to address the Frege-Geach problem.

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References

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  • Receive Date: 10 November 2024
  • Revise Date: 24 November 2024
  • Accept Date: 25 November 2024

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