Emil Lask’s Transcendental Logic

Emil Lask (1875-1915) is usually considered as the las‌t, and one of the mos‌t prominent, member of Neo-Kantianism (especially Baden school). His authentic interpretation of “Philosophy as Transcendental Logic” lies in both continuity and discontinuity with Kant and Neo-Kantianism. Lask claims that categories are not “entities” but “values” and this is the same third realm which lies beyond Aris‌totelian and Kantian doctrine of categories. This is the nuance which dis‌tinguishes Lask’s position from that of both Aris‌totle and Kant. Logical categories, Lask thinks, have their locus neither in the thing nor in consciousness because they “are” not at all. Precise delimitation of the nature of logical categories calls for a dis‌tinction that cuts, across the traditional dis‌tinction, between physical and metaphysical spheres. Of course Hermann Lotze had firs‌t proposed the necessary dis‌tinction between validity and entity. The category “being” does not apply to values. Rather the  values hold or are valid. Lask’s “domain of validity” represents a new precinct for philosophical reflection. As a consequence, the object of transcendental philosophy is “values”. We can claim that through and by Lask, “logic became philosophical again”. Meanwhile, Lask influenced Heidegger in concepts such as “Aletheiology”, “ pretheoretical realm”,” ontological difference” and etc.