Critical Analysis of the Relationship Between Kant’s Philosophy and the Predictive Processing Paradigm

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Department of Philosophy, faculty of literature and humanity, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin

2 Professor in Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanity Sciences, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran

Abstract

This paper analyzes and criticizes Swanson’s position on the relationship betweenthe predictive processing paradigm (hereafter called PP) and Kant’s philosophy. According to Swanson, this paradigm is rooted in the works of Immanuel Kant. He explains and demonstrates this connection in cases such as (1) top-down analysis, (2) the mind and causal structures of the world, (3) reversal and the Copernican revolution, (4) hyperpriorities and forms of intuition, (5) generative models and schemata, and (6) analysis by synthesis. In evaluating his point of view, we demonstrate that his claim encounters difficulties in at least two general instances: first, his reading of PP is completely selective, and he does not consider the significant differences between different readings. Second, his reading of Kant is naturalized and experimental. Such a reading disregards and wipes out the most basic concepts of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, that is, the self or self-conscious subject. Besides, Kant’s approach to the mind is metaphysical, while PP’s approach to the brain is completely empirical. Hence, if there is a fundamental conflict between the PP paradigm and Kant’s transcendental philosophy, then the assertion of compatibility between them faces serious difficulties.

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