Thomas Nagel's Theory of Tragic Epistemology: The Limits of the Subject and the Ideal of Objectivity

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Author

Imam Khomeini International University. Qazvin. Iran

10.48308/kj.2025.241903.1365

Abstract

 



This paper elucidates and analyzes the theory of knowledge in the thought of Thomas Nagel, the contemporary American philosopher, focusing on the fundamental paradox he identifies at the heart of human cognition. By simultaneously embracing realism and skepticism, Nagel establishes a position that can be termed "tragic epistemology." On one hand, it affirms the existence of an independent world and the possibility of objectivity; on the other, it acknowledges the inherent and structural limitations of the human subject in attaining it.
Initially, the role of reason as the primary tool of cognition and the "court of appeal" against subjectivity is examined, demonstrating that for Nagel, reason is the ultimate arbiter and the condition for the possibility of any objectivity. Subsequently, by analyzing the fourfold limitations of the knowing subject—namely existential, temporal, perceptual, and epistemological—the various dimensions of the incompleteness of human knowledge are revealed. Following this, Nagel's critique of reductive and evolutionary explanations for the origin of reason, as well as the concept of the "comprehensive conception" as the ideal endpoint of knowledge, are analyzed.
Ultimately, it is shown that, from Nagel's perspective, the pursuit of truth is both an unavoidable necessity and a perpetually unfinished endeavor for humans. The existential structure of the subject precludes the possibility of attaining absolute knowledge, even as reason incessantly draws him toward it. Thus, the human epistemic condition within Nagel's framework is a tragic one: humans are condemned to seek a truth they can never fully possess.

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