The Dialectic of Causality and Constitution؛ A Structural Rereading of the Phenomenology of Embodied Cognition

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Authors

Department of Philosophy, Theosophy, and Logic, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

10.48308/kj.2025.242192.1375

Abstract

The long-standing mind-body problem, traditionally framed by Cartesian dualism, has led to theoretical impasses in contemporary philosophy of mind. By critiquing dualistic foundations, phenomenology offers a new perspective on embodied cognition and introduces a constellation of concepts. Yet, these concepts are often presented as scattered insights. This research provides a structural rereading of the phenomenological project of embodied cognition to uncover an inner logic connecting them, arguing that this unifying principle emerges from a paradigm shift: the move from causal to constitutive explanations of cognition. Employing a descriptive-analytical method and drawing on the causal-constitutive distinction in contemporary philosophy of science, the study analyzes phenomenology’s internal structure. Findings emerge on two levels: first, these scattered concepts manifest a single “Constitutive Turn,” traced across three domains—the redefinition of the “cognitive agent,” the “cognitive world,” and the “boundaries of cognition.” Second, at a deeper level, phenomenology, by framing constitution as a diachronic process intertwined with causality, transcends the standard causal-constitutive distinction, offering a dynamic and dialectical model for understanding cognition. These findings are significant not only for providing a coherent framework for the phenomenology of embodied cognition but also for furnishing a conceptual tool to engage pivotal debates in the philosophy of mind and address theoretical challenges with a non-reductive framework.

Keywords

References

Chalmers, D. J. (2000). Facing up to the hard problem of consciousness. In The Character of Consciousness (pp. 3–34). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.003.0001
Craver, C. F. (2007). Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
Descartes, R. (1984). Meditations on first philosophy (J. Cottingham, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1641)
Descartes, R. (1985). The passions of the soul (S. Voss, Trans.). Hackett Publishing. (Original work published 1649)
Fuchs, T. (2017). Ecology of the brain: The phenomenology and biology of the embodied mind. Oxford University Press.
Fuchs, T. (2020). Time, the body, and the other in phenomenology and psychopathology. In C. Tewes & G. Stanghellini (Eds.) , Time and body: Phenomenological and psychopathological approaches (pp. 12–40). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108776660
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2012). The phenomenological mind (2nd ed.). Routledge.
Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary didn’t know. The Journal of Philosophy, 83(5), 291–295. https://doi.org/ 10.2307/2026143
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2012). Phenomenology of perception (D. A. Landes, Trans.). Routledge. (Original work published 1945)
Salmon, W. C. (1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton University Press.
Sartre, J.-P. (1956). Being and Nothingness: An essay on phenomenological ontology (H. E. Barnes, Trans.). Philosophical Library. (Original work published 1943)
Ylikoski: (2013). Causal and Constitutive Explanation Compared. Erkenntnis, 78(Suppl 2), 277–297. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9513-9
Zahavi, D. (2003). Husserl’s phenomenology. Stanford University Press.
Shenakht
Volume 18, Issue 4
December 2026
Pages 31-53

Files

History

  • Receive Date: 27 October 2025
  • Revise Date: 17 November 2025
  • Accept Date: 20 December 2025

Share

How to cite

Statistics