As Critique of Pure Reason testifies, one of Kant’s major concerns in his critical philosophy is to provide an answer for hope question: “If I do what I should, what may I then hope?” if one fulfills moral duties required by reason, how much hope could he have for achieving happiness? In other words, to what extent do requirements of morality and requirements of nature coincide so that virtue could be rewarded by happiness? In his early works, Kant tries to answer this question from a moral point of view, but it fails to be satisfactory because of the deep gap between nature and morality in his theoretical and practical philosophy. The main claim of this essay is that in his Critique of the power of Judgment, Kant actually tries to remove the defects of his theory of hope through bridging the gap between nature and morality and he eventually succeeds in working out a more satisfactory theory by using the idea of purposiveness of nature in philosophy of history
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