Defending Sohrawardy against Molla Sadra

The notorious polemic by Molla Sadrs against Sohrawardy pertains to the reference of the term “existence”. While the latter believes that “the term designates nothing in the real world” the other stresses that “there is no genuine reality except the nature of existence”. Molla Sadra rejects Sohrawardy’s analysis through proposing a new definition for “being” as a predicate. In this proposal, the hitherto accepted definition of “being” in terms of “some real entity” is replaced by “whatever that exists”. In this way, Molla Sadra tries to retain the old notion of univocal sense of the term “being” while adopting the view that the term refers without confronting the charge of infinite regress. We can refute this claim : Molla Sadra’s analysis of the predicate of existence is either peculiar to this particular predicate or applicable to all predicates. Opting for the first choice amounts to his argument facing the charge of circularity. The second option runs into numerous counter examples. Thus, we can defend Sohrawardy’s position: the predicate of existence is either equivocal or abstract. The secret of this dispute lies in the theory of meaning.