Baxter and Armstrong, a Case for Metaphysical exchange on the Problem of Instantiation

Document Type : مقاله کوتاه

Abstract

Armstrong uses Baxterian partial identity in order to explain how certain propositions that are indicating instantiation of universals in particulars have been made necessarily true. I will argue that partial identity between universals and particular is corrupted for two reasons: first that universals and particulars have no formal parts in Armstrongian sense, and second that Barxterian cross-count partial identity has no counterpart in Armstrong's metaphysics . I conclude that Baxterian partial identity does not explain the desired propositions.

Keywords


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