An Enquiry into Peerhood in Disagreements over the Existence of God: the Impossibility of Achieving Peerhood.

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Author

M.A. in philosophy of science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

10.29252/kj.2022.223332.1060

Abstract

 the question of whether the existence of such disagreements reduces the justification and rationality of belief in God. Reductionists (or Conciliationists) in the epistemology of disagreement, argue that the awareness of disagreement among epistemic peers, which indicates the possibility of relevant and serious error, will lead to the reduction of justification and rationality of beliefs. Thus, examining whether disputants who disagree about God’s existence are epistemic peers becomes an important problem: if parties are epistemic peers, these disagreements lead to the reduction of beliefs in God. In this article, I examine the peerhood of the disputants in this dispute. Firstly, I describe Frederick Choo’s argument which concludes that the parties of disputes are not epistemic peers by pointing out the difference in the methodologies of disputants. Secondly, I discuss James Kraft’s article which argues in response to Choo and in favor of confirmed peerhood (claims that disputants are epistemic peers). By tracing the significant differences of disputants back to common epistemic grounds, Kraft tries to show that the disputants are epistemic peers. After evaluating and criticizing the arguments, I show that if the disputants use different methodologies to disagree about God’s existence, the awareness of disagreement will not have a serious effect on reducing the justification and rationality of the disputants’ beliefs.

Keywords

References

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Shinakht (A Persian Word Means Knowledge)
Volume 14, Issue 2 - Serial Number 85
February 2022
Pages 195-222

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History

  • Receive Date: 23 August 2021
  • Revise Date: 02 December 2021
  • Accept Date: 05 February 2022

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