Objectivity and Its Possibility Conditions from Merleau-Ponty’s Point of View

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Author

University of Tabriz

10.29252/kj.2022.220794.1016

Abstract

According to Merleau-Ponty, the intentionality that Husserl speaks of represents reflective action and the objectifying of t consciousness which examines the cons‌tituted experiences from above as an object for the subject. As a result of this intentionality, the pre-reflective and cons‌tituted confrontation with the world is impossible and the pre-predictive unity of the subject and the object remains hidden. To solve this problem, then, we mus‌t consider an intentionality as a fundamental intentionality by which consciousness, without explicitly conceptualizing and ins‌tead of assuming its own objects, turns to them. This intentionality, which Merleau-Ponty calls “operative intentionality,” does not depend on the intention being in front of the subject, but on the initial orientation of the subject towards the world by which the subject is placed in the world and cannot be considered outside or separate from it. The presence of the subject in the world is made possible by the subject’s body. As a result, the body becomes a tool for consciousness that allows it to communicate directly with the objects around consciousness. Such a meaning of intentionality means that it is no longer possible to regard objectivity as finding the nature of objects in transcendental consciousness. Rather, objectivity is the moment in which the world is given to the subject in the perceptual experience. In this article we explain how this meaning of objectivity is realized and its conditions in Merleau-Ponty phenomenology.

Keywords

References

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History

  • Receive Date: 21 February 2021
  • Revise Date: 18 January 2022
  • Accept Date: 30 June 2022

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