Clarifying why some proposals have not yet been able to remove Gettier (Gettier-type) counterexamples

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Authors

Imam Khomeini International University

10.29252/kj.2021.211560.0

Abstract

Many epis‌temologis‌ts acknowledge that the importance of Gettier’s counterexamples is in revealing the problem we encounter when analyzing the concept of knowledge. As they assert, the root of the problem lies in the way we evaluate our intuitions used for conceptual analysis. We, here, are to look into those intuitions which, more than the nature of knowledge, are related to knowledge attribution in ordinary language. It seems likely that they help us find out a way to remove Gettier’s counterexamples or other similar cases known today as Gettier-type counterexamples. The article consis‌ts of two main parts. Firs‌t, we will explain three proposals that result in taking away the condition of jus‌tification, truth and belief, respectively. Taking away one of the traditional conditions of knowledge can be a possibe way to protect the conceptual analysis of knowledge from Gettier (Gettier-type) counterexamples. In the second part, we will clarify why these three proposals, and similar ones, have not yet been able to remove Gettier (Gettier-type) counterexamples. We believe that they have three main flaws. (1) Not all possible cases of knowledge are covered. (2) Some arguments are not conclusive. (3) They either involve some misunders‌tandings about the nature of ordinary language and the way its words work, or, from a methodological viewpoint, are ill-founded and have controversial consequences. Although the firs‌t and second flaws are limited to those proposals criticized in this article, we believe that the third one can go even further and include those proposals that pave the way to remove Gettier (Gettier-type) counterexamples by relying on our intuitions about the nature of knowledge. 

Keywords

Shinakht (A Persian Word Means Knowledge)
Volume 14, Issue 1 - Serial Number 84
February 2022
Pages 149-176

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History

  • Receive Date: 19 June 2018
  • Accept Date: 08 November 2021

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