Gottlobe Frege is considered as one of the first incisive critics of psychologism in logic and semantics. In this article, firstly, Frege's critics of Ideational Theory of Meaning is discussed. According to Frege, this theory invalidates truth, but also problematizes meaning and the possibility of communication as well. These critics are framed through Frege's main conceptual frameworks, namely, logisim and the first theorem of Grundlage der Arithmetik, by which he distinguishes between the objective/logical and the subjective/psychological. Then, this critics is also compared with later Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument (PLA). We argue that a detailed account of Frege's concept of idea illustrates that his assumptions about the relation between the inner world (Innenwelt) and language could be criticized. Through discussing "private definition of a sign'', ''following a rule'' and ''criteria of the identity'', Wittgenstein's definition of the Private Language and his arguments against it are analyzed so that we can critically study these assumptions.
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کوته‌نوشت آثار فرگه:
(G) Der Gedanke: Eine Logische Untersuchung, in Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I (1918–1919): 58–77, 1918
(GL) Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik: eine logisch-mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl, Breslau: W. Koebner, 1884
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(PW) Posthomus Writing, ed. by H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, F. Kaulbach, tr. by P. Long, R. White, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979
(ÜSB) Über Sinn und Bedeutung, in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100: 25–50, 1892
کوته‌نوشت آثار ویتگنشتاین:
(BB) The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958
(BGM) Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik, G.E.M. Anscombe, Rush Rhees and G.H. von Wright, eds. in Schriften 6, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974
(NFP) Notes for the ‘Philosophical Lecture’, in Philosophical Occasions 1912–51, ed. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993:447-458
(NPS) Notes for Lectures on ‘Private Experience’ and ‘Sense Data’,in Philosophil Occasions 1912-51, ed. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993: 202- 289
(2017). انتقادات ِفرگه به نظریه‌ی ایده‌انگارانه‌ی معنا و استدلال ِویتگنشتاین علیه زبان خصوصی. Shinakht (A Persian Word Means Knowledge), 10(1), 87-108.
MLA
. "انتقادات ِفرگه به نظریه‌ی ایده‌انگارانه‌ی معنا و استدلال ِویتگنشتاین علیه زبان خصوصی". Shinakht (A Persian Word Means Knowledge), 10, 1, 2017, 87-108.
HARVARD
(2017). 'انتقادات ِفرگه به نظریه‌ی ایده‌انگارانه‌ی معنا و استدلال ِویتگنشتاین علیه زبان خصوصی', Shinakht (A Persian Word Means Knowledge), 10(1), pp. 87-108.
VANCOUVER
انتقادات ِفرگه به نظریه‌ی ایده‌انگارانه‌ی معنا و استدلال ِویتگنشتاین علیه زبان خصوصی. Shinakht (A Persian Word Means Knowledge), 2017; 10(1): 87-108.
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