From the Vagueness of Material Objects to Emergent Substance Dualism

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Author

Ph.D. Student in Moral Philosophy, University of Qom, Qom, Iran

10.48308/kj.2026.243025.1396

Abstract

The question of the nature and metaphysical status of the self is among the most challenging issues in the philosophy of mind. Although contemporary philosophers tend to show less favor toward substance dualism, Dean Zimmerman—by focusing on the vagueness of ordinary material objects and the problem of the many—has advanced a novel argument against materialism and sought to defend emergent substance dualism. This argument has provoked serious responses and critiques from materialist philosophers. The present study, while defending Zimmerman’s position, first offers a more streamlined formulation of his argument by eliminating certain unnecessary assumptions. In the next step, through a critical evaluation of materialist replies, it aims to demonstrate the inadequacy of their proposed solutions. Ultimately, the concluding argument of the paper contends that any materialist attempt to sharpen the material boundaries of the self in order to escape the problem of vagueness inevitably commits materialists to a framework that resembles emergent substance dualism—such that the boundary between the two views becomes increasingly difficult to maintain.

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References

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History

  • Receive Date: 25 December 2025
  • Revise Date: 10 February 2026
  • Accept Date: 10 May 2026

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