The Role of Lived Body in Objectification of Objects from Merleau-ponty Point of View

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Authors

1 دانشگاه تبریز

2 Tabriz university

Abstract

Merleau-ponty's descriptive of operative intentionality opens new way to express new meanings of the constitution and the objectivity. His analysis of such intentionality provides a tangible and pre-reflective, but meaningful means, for the purpose of having a world and embodied objects. Merleau Ponty believes that consciousness, due to its intentional character, is directed toward its own objects in the world. The objects of consciousness are not determinate and definite things, but are in areas that are intrinsically meaningful, and this meaning is revealed in the face of the subject. Consciousness uses the body as point of view to face the objects. Accordingly, Merleau Pontius places consciousness in the body and considers the body as a subject-body that is present in the world around itself and is in contact with the objects through perceptual experience. What emerges during this experience is a kind of perceptual perception of the tangible world as a place of practical life. The subject always presents through his body within the universe in which he researches and acts and in the embodiment face, gives objectivity to indeterminate objects. This determination is due to the motor intentionality and the synthesis unity of the body. In this article, we are going to highlight the role of the body in this determination.

Keywords

References

 
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Shinakht (A Persian Word Means Knowledge)
Volume 12, Issue 2
May 2019
Pages 71-93

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History

  • Receive Date: 05 January 2019
  • Revise Date: 03 January 2022
  • Accept Date: 31 December 2020

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