نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی
نویسندگان
دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه معاصر غرب، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
Gottlobe Frege is considered as one of the first incisive critics of psychologism in logic and semantics. In this article, firstly, Frege's critics of Ideational Theory of Meaning is discussed. According to Frege, this theory invalidates truth, but also problematizes meaning and the possibility of communication as well. These critics are framed through Frege's main conceptual frameworks, namely, logisim and the first theorem of Grundlage der Arithmetik, by which he distinguishes between the objective/logical and the subjective/psychological. Then, this critics is also compared with later Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument (PLA). We argue that a detailed account of Frege's concept of idea illustrates that his assumptions about the relation between the inner world (Innenwelt) and language could be criticized. Through discussing "private definition of a sign'', ''following a rule'' and ''criteria of the identity'', Wittgenstein's definition of the Private Language and his arguments against it are analyzed so that we can critically study these assumptions.
کلیدواژهها [English]
)