نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانش آموخته کارشناسی ارشد دانشگاه صنعتی شریف
2 استادیار فلسفه علم دانشگاه صنعتی شریف
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Pessimistic induction is often seen as the main argument against scientific realism. According to this argument, the history of science has revealed that past theories, despite being successful, subsequently turned out to be false, and therefore (given that the only criterion provided by realists, i.e., success, is not indicative of truth), current successful theories are also false. Kyle Stanford believes that the defect in the (standard) pessimistic induction is that realists can challenge it by pointing out how the success of current theories is different from the success of past theories. Therefore, he designs a new (pessimistic) induction in order to overcome such a defect and have a more powerful argument. His induction differs from standard pessimistic induction in that he bases it on theorists instead of theories: Past theorists have repeatedly failed to conceive serious alternatives to their theories, but subsequent scientific inquiries would routinely reveal that there were such alternatives; since current theorists choose their theories based on this failure, then the (approximate) truth of current theories is also not believable.
In this paper, we discuss Stanford’s new induction and assess his claim that it is more powerful. The findings of this study show that, although having a different form than the old induction, the new induction is not a stronger argument.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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