نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
دانشیار دانشگاه پیام نور، تهران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The Gettier problem is a set of counter examples that challenges the standard definition of knowledge within epistemology before the second half of the 20th century. According to the standard definition, which we call JTB, knowledge is nothing more than a justified true believing. The problem, roughly, is that the standard definition does not include the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge, since there might be some counter examples that are not cases of knowledge, even if they are cases of justified true believing. Since then epistemologists have gone to a lot of trouble to avoid, or resolve, or even to deny, the Gettier problem. One of the main efforts to resolve the problem has been done by a theory called externalism which has two main forms: causal theory and reliabilism. Reliabilism considers the concept or the condition of justification as the main source of the Gettier problem and tries to replace it, accordingly, with a second and different one, i.e. a reliable process. This concept or condition is focused on the role of an external process that creates mostly the true beliefs in a person. This article argues that the externalist-reliabilist proposal is not capable of resolving the Gettier problem.
کلیدواژهها [English]