نوع مقاله : مقاله کوتاه
نویسندگان
استادیار رشتۀ فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
Armstrong uses Baxterian partial identity in order to explain how certain propositions that are indicating instantiation of universals in particulars have been made necessarily true. I will argue that partial identity between universals and particular is corrupted for two reasons: first that universals and particulars have no formal parts in Armstrongian sense, and second that Barxterian cross-count partial identity has no counterpart in Armstrong's metaphysics . I conclude that Baxterian partial identity does not explain the desired propositions.
کلیدواژهها [English]