Davidson's criticism of Kuhn's theory of incommensurability

Davidson's causal theory of meaning is known as one of the main criticisms of Kuhn's theory of incommensurability. In this essay, first I would present briefly the theory of incommensurability according to the first edition of structure of scientific revolutions and its modifications in the second edition. Then, I would elaborate Davidson's arguments against it in detail, showing that from a radical interpreter's point of view this theory requires unreasonable semantic consequences. In the third section, I would try to defend Kuhn's theory by borrowing reasons from Howard Sankey, one his famous commentators. He criticizes Davidson's semantic arguments by showing that dependence of interpretation on translation, Davison's main assumption, is unacceptable. Last of all, I would argue that incommensurability and radical interpretation both are depended on charity principle, providing hope for a reconciliation between them, on the condition that Davidson's unnecessary assumption is removed.