نوع مقاله : علمی - پژوهشی
نویسنده
پژوهشگاه دانشهای بنیادین
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Broadly construed, physicalism is the thesis that everything in the world is physical. However, certain entities and properties whose existence appears undeniable seem to conflict with this claim, rendering its acceptance problematic. Consciousness, in particular, is a mental feature whose reduction poses a significant challenge for physicalists, as the doctrine requires that everything bears a metaphysical dependence on physical entities. Nevertheless, this challenge can only be properly evaluated once a clear formulation of the physicalist claim is established. This paper explores that very issue. I address three major problems facing the formulation of physicalism, namely Hempel’s Dilemma, the Problem of Extras, and the Problem of Blockers. I argue that the first dilemma can be resolved by adopting a primitive concept of physical properties. Furthermore, I contend that among the various strategies successful in addressing the second problem, only David Chalmers’ solution proves capable of resolving the Problem of Blockers.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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