نسبت فلسفه‌ی زبان و فلسفه‌ی ذهنِ ویتگنشتاین در استدلال علیه زبان خصوصی

The Private Language Argument (henceforth PLA) has two closely related aspects: a semantic aspect and the one which is concerned with the problem of knowing the inner experiences in philosophy of mind. For the former, it would be exposed that the traditional and common theory of the relation between words, which signify the phenomenal content of our experiences, and their references is rejected. According to this theory, everyone could individually associate his/her private experience with a name and by this, he/she is justified in using that name. But if the grammar of uttering the phenomenal content of our experiences is based on the model of private object-name, the object could be removed, as it has no role in the process of naming. A name, as a sign, must be defined. This definition surely serves to establish the meaning of that sign, and declares, where the sign can and should be used. Wittgenstein argues that any private definition is invalid. Suppose one, through connecting a sign with an inner sensation, decides to define the sign only by oneself. Thus, he/she should remember the connection rightly in the future, otherwise the definition is invalid. However, no matter what this definition is, he/she has no criterion for realizing the difference between the right and a mere seemingly right use of that sign. For, he/she is not able privately identify, where the same sign is repeated. He/she might be under the influence of an instant illusion. Talking about sameness of past and present use of that sign is absolutely in vain. It only means that here we cannot talk about 'right' use of such a sign, because we cannot identify the repetition of that sign in the future and, and in the presence as well. But we do name our inner sensations! It seems to be a paradox. According to Wittgenstein, it is just a misunderstanding, because we forget that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. This stage-setting is already formed in ordinary language-games. On the second part of article, it is indicated how a defender of PLA seeks to adopt his/her own 'recognizable' knowledge of those inner sensations, provided by mere introspection. It is because he/she intends on affirming an individual relation with his/her inner experiences, and, hence, justifying a private language game. Again, if a normal language-game is abrogated, he/she cannot talk about any type of these privacies. 'Knowing the inner' is not a private introspectional process and it is not a part of the mechanism of naming as well. Thus, this private game is, according to Wittgenstein, just an illusion. Moreover, it presents many difficulties for two significant issues in philosophy of mind, namely, the problem of other minds and knowing the 'dispositions'. Such difficulties are originally rooted in a Cartesian notion of mind, which would be rejected as a result of Wittgenstein’s Argument