Early Wittgenstein’s view about “there is something

Document Type : مقاله مروری

Abstract

Picture theory challenges existential propositions having meaning. In Tractatus these propositions are neither elementary nor synthetic. We can find two viewpoints by searching about existence in Tractatus. At the first point of view Wittgenstein define “exist” as a formal concept because it is not describing any state of affairs. He states this by saying that such propositions as “there are 100 objects” have no meaning. At the second point of view by presenting a description of “there is something” He states that this proposition is prior to experience and even logic. The matter in the first view is similar to Russell’s at result and way of conclusion but by the second one Wittgenstein rejects Russell’s opinion about logical representation of “there is something” and claims that there is no propositional function representing it. In Wittgenstein’s view legitimation of using identity in Russell’s logic causes this fault. So impossibility of representing a bipolar picture from “there is something” beside part 5.53 of Tractatus could both be reasons to deny identity-sing as an essential constituent of conceptual notation

Keywords


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