The New Evil Demon Problem for Internalists

Document Type : علمی - پژوهشی

Author

Graduate of PhD in Philosophy, University of Tehran

10.29252/kj.2022.214330.0

Abstract

 Epistemologists in various theories of epistemic justification attempt to respect the intuition that lies at the new evil demon problem. One of the most important problems that external theory has in justification is the conflict of these theories with the intuition that lies in the new evil demon problem. Recently, Moon has tried to raise this problem against moderate internalists by argument. If Moon’s argument is correct, most internalists face the same problem. In this article, I discuss and evaluate Moon’s argument and the answer given to it in defense of internalism. While examining this issue, I increase the accuracy of the internalists’ response to this problem. In addition, I show that Moon’s argument against internalists is not correct.

Keywords

References

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History

  • Receive Date: 31 October 2020
  • Revise Date: 05 December 2021
  • Accept Date: 05 February 2022

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